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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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TERREP

STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA AND WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016

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SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FARC THREAT TO EMBASSY BOGOTA

REF: (A) TD-314/81681-06 (B) RSO SPOT REPORTS 11/22
AND 11/27 (C) TD-314/83602-06

Classified By: RSO Robert Hartung; Reason 1.4 (c,d)

11. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Embassy Bogota is in receipt of information concerning a possible attack by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) against the American Embassy compound, allegedly being coordinated by elements of the FARC's Antonio Narino Urban Front (RUAN). Biographic details of the sources of the information are contained in REF A and 1C. Source information indicates that the planning for the attack may be complete, and that it is planned for prior to December 15, 2006. RSO and SIMO continue to meet and debrief a series of informants with claimed knowledge of the RUAN attack plans and are jointly coordinating with Government of Colombia (GOC) investigative and intelligence entities in an effort to identify and disrupt the RUAN operation. RSO has augmented post's security with both Embassy and host government assets. RSO and SIMO have briefed the senior levels of the Colombian National Police and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS). Post will report additional details as they develop. END SUMMARY.

12. (S/NF) On November 17, 2006, Embassy Bogota learned of an alleged RUAN plan as first reported in REF A. RSO and SIMO have subsequently met and debriefed the original source of the information and two subsources, recently demobilized RUAN members with intimate knowledge of RUAN operational planning. The original source was polygraphed by a U.S. Government polygrapher and showed no indication of deception in basic questioning regarding his knowledge of the attack plan. Details of these debriefings were forwarded via REF B and C. The source(s) have stated that to their knowledge RUAN has conducted surveillance of the embassy compound and the surrounding area for at least the last several months and have discussed three potential attack scenarios. The first and most preferred scenario would be a standoff canister or motor attack against the compound utilizing a commercial truck or a municipal garbage truck. The second scenario would be to detonate an improvised explosive device in a taxi being driven by an unwitting driver (VBIED) in front of one of the two compound vehicle entrances. The third option would be small arms fire directed at employees entering and exiting the compound. The source(s) reiterated that the preferred option would be the stand off mortar/canister attack which is known to be fairly effective from a distance of 300 meters, although past FARC attacks via this method have been limited in accuracy. The source(s) stated that the RUAN has discussed the preference to stage a canister/mortar attack in the early morning hours between 0300 and 0400 due to the perceived reduction in security alertness at the embassy during these hours.

13. (S/NF) RSO and SIMO have met with and will continue to work with appropriate officials from the GOC police and intelligence services to further identify the RUAN members allegedly involved in the plan in an effort to disrupt the attack. RSO and SIMO have briefed senior levels of the CNP and the DAS concerning this threat information.

14. (S/NF) RSO and SIMO are scheduled to meet with a third

subsource on the afternoon of November 28, 2006. This subsource is an active member of RUAN with reported access to the highest levels of the organization and who purportedly is willing to cooperate with U.S. Government officials to identify and disrupt this alleged plan. (Biographic details of this subsource are contained in REF C). RSO and SIMO plan to polygraph this source as well.

15. (C) RSO has increased the number, hours, frequency and coverage of the embassy perimeter and immediate vicinity of post surveillance detection teams, local guards and mobile patrols. Additional armed positions have been established at each of the compound access points and greater scrutiny of approaching vehicles has been implemented. Colombian Police intelligence have implemented additional surveillance of suspect attack/launch areas and the uniformed Colombian police presence around the perimeter have been appropriately briefed to maintain enhanced vigilance. RSO will again meet with Colombian Police to assess security coverage on the morning of November 29, 2006. Further, RSO is conducting a thorough review of all SIMAS database entries and will share this information with the CNP and cooperating sources in an attempt to exploit this information.

16. (U) Embassy Bogota will report additional information as it develops.

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